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Abstract 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the focus of U.S. counter-terrorism operations has slowly shifted from 
the battlefields of Afghanistan to those in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The use of armed 
drones in these regions to target members of al-Qaeda and its associate forces has engendered 
an intensive debate in international law. The U.S. drone policy during Obama’s regime 
claimed to abide by the international rules on targeting while conducting drone operations in 
remote territories of the world. But, in the light of issue regarding the increasing number of 
civilian casualties, combatant-civilian divide and accountability vis-a-vis carrying out drone 
operations, the approach undertaken by U.S. policy makers, presumably, has misinterpreted 
existing laws applicable to the conduct of hostilities. The policy lacked clarity on the 
applicable legal regime as well as restraints to prevent any misuse of the drone technology 
leading to a popular view that there has been an unabated use of armed drones by the U.S. 
administration without transparency or accountability.  
Despite the vast literature on the 9/11 attacks and the discussion among scholars on the use of 
drones by U.S., the compatibility between the rules on targeting under international 
humanitarian law and the drone operations conducted by the U.S., remains as an area which 
is less examined under international law. Therefore, in light of issues like, civilian causalities, 
collateral damage, violation of international humanitarian law principles etc., that pose a 
challenge to the legality of drone operations, it is necessary to examine whether or not the 
U.S targeting practices are in violation of the law of armed conflict. The present paper deals 
with the specific issue of whether or not the U.S. policy during the Obama’s regime on drone 
usage was in conformity with the international rules and principles concerning the conduct of 
hostilities, with the main focus on the rules on targeting. The paper concludes with comments 
on problems surrounding present drone warfare. Further, it also, briefly touches upon some 
key issues that need to be borne in mind to move towards a possible drone accountability 
regime at the international level, recognizing the fact that states are reluctant in agreeing to 
create any strict, legal and binding international regime on matters pertaining to security and 
humanitarian laws. 





A key component of United States (U.S.) foreign policy during the Obama regime was to 
dismantle and defeat the al-Qaeda and its associate forces (whom the U.S. regarded as a 
transnational non-state entity which posed a constant threat to its national security and also 
with whom the U.S. was engaged in an ongoing conflict) that mostly operated in regions 
along the Afghan-Pakistan border.1 In an attempt to step up the war against al-Qaeda, the 
U.S. increasingly relied upon the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones to target 
and kill ‘terrorists’.2 ‘Drones are remotely piloted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
equipped with surveillance technology and accurate missiles and are able to hover over 
terrorist and insurgent strongholds for long periods to identify and strike targets’.3 Post 2009, 
drones have become a crucial part of U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Afghan-Pakistan 
region.4 Drones strikes have proven to be immensely effective for the U.S. administration in 
terms of locating and killing terrorists while avoiding the challenges that come with 
employing traditional armed forces.5 Nonetheless, the U.S. drone policy has faced criticism 
on a number of grounds, most importantly, the compliance of U.S. drone program with the 
principles of international humanitarian law.6 Following the critique from the international 
community, the United Nations and other non-governmental organisations for the legal 
justification provided for the drone strikes by the U.S., Harold Koh, the former U.S. State 
Department Legal Adviser presented the ‘considered view’ of the Obama Administration in 
relation to the U.S. targeting operations.7 Koh mentioned that ‘great care is taken to adhere to 
the principles of distinction and proportionality in both planning and execution of lethal 
targeting operations, and emphasised that such operations comply with all the applicable 
laws, including the laws of war’.8 However, Koh’s remarks with reference to ‘Use of Force as 
                                                          
1 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defense University’ (National Defense University, 
23 May 2013) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university> accessed 26 May 2018. 
2 David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence?’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16 (2005), p. 173. 
3 Megan Smith & James Igoe Walsh, ‘Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda 
Output’, in Terrorism & Political Violence, Vol. 25 (2013), p. 311. 
4 Jordan J. Paust, ‘Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. use of drones in 
Pakistan’, in Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 19 (2010), p. 275. 
5 Ryan J. Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and Law of Armed Conflict’, in Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, Vol. 39 (2010), p. 103. 
6 Ibid, p. 103. 
7 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’ (Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, 25 March 2010) <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> 
accessed 26 May 2018.  
8 Ibid.  
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part of the Law on 9/11’9 and subsequent policy documents released by the U.S. 
administration in order to legally justify the use of drones as part of counter-terrorism 
operations to target al-Qaeda terrorists in the context of non-international armed conflict, 
have failed to adequately explain how far does the U.S. foreign policy obey international 
laws.10  
Though, a lot has been written about the ‘global war against terrorism’ and the use of force 
by the U.S. in response to 9/11, the present paper takes a closer look at the specific features 
of the U.S. drone policy under the Obama administration in the current phase of the war 
against al-Qaeda within the framework of legal rules and principles governing the laws of 
armed conflict. The paper aims to make a legal assessment of U.S. drone strikes within the 
framework of armed conflict. It also examines some of the underlying principles that regulate 
the law on targeting such as (1) indiscriminate attacks, (2) proportionality (3) precaution and 
(4) distinction vis-a-vis the al-Qaeda conflict. In short, this paper draws attention towards the 
controversies resulting from the legal principles of jus in bello and their 
application/interpretation with regard to the use of drones. The paper attempts to address the 
following fundamental questions through Section 1: a. Is it against the international 
humanitarian law principles to conduct a drone strike indiscriminately? and b. Does the U.S. 
policy governing its use of drones comply with the international humanitarian principles of 
distinction and proportionality? and, Section 2, examines how the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities been interpreted in the context of the al-Qaeda conflict? The 
primary focus of this paper is to examine the general principles on targeting governing the 
use of lethal force in an armed conflict, examine them, and reflect on whether or not the U.S 
drone program abides by those rules.  
Section 1. Evaluating U.S. Drone Strikes under the Core Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law  
Today, a number of legal objections have been raised against the U.S. targeting policies and 
its interpretation of international law. It is alleged that, the use of drones extraterritorially to 
dismantle al-Qaeda networks is violative of the laws of war.11 On the other hand, the Obama 
                                                          
9 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’. – The ‘Law of 9/11’, in general terms is the practice 
undertaken by the U.S. administration in all aspects of ongoing armed conflicts in particular, detention 
operations, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects – in a manner consistent not just with the applicable 
laws of war, but also with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
10 Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and Law of Armed Conflict’, p. 103. 
11 Martin S Flaherty, ‘The Constitution Follows The Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and Judicial 
Safeguards’, in Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 38 (2015), p. 26. 
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administration claimed that it followed the laws of war while using force in foreign 
territories.12 In this regard, it is essential to examine certain key underlying principles that 
regulate the laws on targeting (indiscriminate attacks, proportionality precaution and 
distinction) to ascertain how far the legal rules are applied in conducting drone operations and 
what limitations do these rules place on drone warfare.13  
1.1 Indiscriminate Attacks: The ICRC has made an attempt to put to rest the debate with 
respect to what constitutes indiscriminate attacks for the purposes of non-international armed 
conflict. Following are some of the arguments advanced by the ICRC in relation to applying 
the definition of indiscriminate attacks as used in international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts. Article 51(4) (a) of Additional Protocol I Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 1977, provides the definition of 
indiscriminate attacks.14 Additional Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts 1977 does not define indiscriminate attacks. However, 
‘subsections (a) and (b) of the definition contained in Article 51(4) are included by inference 
within the prohibition contained in Article 13(2) on making the civilian population the object 
of attack’.15 Other than that the definition of indiscriminate attacks is also included in various 
military manuals applied to both international and non-international armed conflicts.16 
Additional evidence of the applicability of the definition of indiscriminate attacks in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts can be found in the advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case.17 On the issue of method and 
means of combat, it is important to note that, although drones represent a superior tool for the 
application of force, the same does not make them inherently illegal in an armed conflict as 
long as they are employed in conformity with the laws of war.18 With regard to directing an 
attack against military objectives, under non-international armed conflicts, it is vital on part 
of attacking states to clearly distinguish between specific military objectives and from 
                                                          
12 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’.  
13 Shakeel Ahmad, ‘A Legal Assessment of the US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, in International Criminal Law 
Review, Vol. 13 (2013), p. 925. 
14 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 51 (4) (a).  
15 ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Database’ <https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter3_rule12> 
accessed 26 May 2018. 
16 Ibid. 
17 ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Database’. - the International Court of Justice stated in the Nuclear Weapons case that 
the prohibition of weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets constitutes 
an ‘intransgressible’ principle of customary international law. The Court observed that, in conformity with this 
principle, humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons ‘because of their 
indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians’. 
18 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 371. 
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civilians/civilian objects.19 This distinction is important given that ‘the presence of members 
of an armed group in a particular area can lead to the destruction of the entire area, even in 
situations in which the members could be targeted in isolation and on an individual basis’.20 
In relation to the al-Qaeda conflict, one particular criticism leveled against drones is that they 
are responsible for the deaths of innocent civilians.21 The U.S. however, claimed that its 
drone operations are lawful under international humanitarian law. According to P.W. Singer, 
drones are ‘cleaner’ alternatives to traditional methods of aerial attacks because of their 
ability to hover over a territory for hours together and perform precision attacks.22 Singer 
further mentions that, the use of armed drones have offered numerous ways of reducing the 
mistakes and unintended costs of war by including the use of better sensors and advanced 
method for processing information that allow decisions to be made in a more conscious 
manner removing the possibility of human error.23 The exactness of drones, as per Singer, 
reduces by a great margin the number of mistakes made, as well as the number of civilian 
casualties that may occur.24 Senior U.S. officials have consistently said that the procedures 
and practices involved in identifying targets in the al-Qaeda conflict are extremely rigorous, 
and the use of advanced technology has helped to make the targeting more accurate.25 They 
also add that the use of drones for targeting operations is beneficial because the same has in 
fact promoted the humanitarian objective of sparing civilians by conducting precision 
attacks.26  
However, as per Kevin Jon Heller, contrary to the claim made by U.S. officials, the U.S. 
appears to have conducted drone strikes on the basis of a number of signatures that are either 
by itself unlawful under the law of armed conflict or can only be lawful if interpreted in a 
manner inconsistent with the international legal rules.27 Furthermore, there are also serious 
questions about whether the U.S. requires ‘evidence of targetability, sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of civilian status attached to individuals and many kinds of objects under the 
                                                          
19 Michael W. Lewis and Emily Crawford, ‘Drones and Distinction: How IHL encouraged the rise of drones’, in 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 44 (2013), p. 1153. 
20 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 348.  
21 Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, ‘Toward a Drone Accountability Regime’, in Ethics & International 
Affairs, Vol. 29 (2015), p. 22. 
22 P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century (Penguin 
Press, 2009), p. 397-398. 
23 P.W. Singer, ‘Military Robots and Laws of War’ (The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology & Society, 
2009) <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090203_TNA23Singer.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and International Law’, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11 (2013), p. 97-103. 
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international humanitarian law’.28 Nevertheless, the U.S. has consistently argued that it 
continues to comply with all international humanitarian laws in its conflict with al Qaeda.29 
Yet, how far the U.S. responses to al Qaeda’s threat take into consideration al-Qaeda’s 
blending in with the civilian population in territories of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia 
remains unclear. Further, ‘between 2009 and 31 December 2015, the administration has 
claimed that it launched 473 strikes, mostly with drones, that led to the death of almost 2,500 
terrorist ‘combatants’ raising significant questions on the over usage of drone technology. 
However, the data provided by the administration has also been criticised of it being less than 
the actual number of attacks.30  
1.2) Principle of Proportionality: Similar to the discussion on indiscriminate attacks, the 
principle of proportionality reflects upon the results of an attack on civilian objects and 
civilians with regard to the accomplishment of a military objective. Article 51(5(b) of 
Additional Protocol I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
1977 codifies the principle of proportionality in attack.31 Even though, Additional Protocol II 
1977 does not make an explicit mention of the principle of proportionality in attack, it has 
been argued that ‘it is inherent in the principle of humanity which was explicitly made 
applicable to the Protocol in its preamble and that as a result, the principle of proportionality 
cannot be ignored in the application of the Protocol’.32 The rule on proportionality has also 
been described as a ‘general principle of humanitarian law’ which is applicable in all 
conflicts. It also finds support in treaty law which is applied to non-international armed 
conflicts.33 In addition, military manuals that are used in non-international armed conflicts 
have included the principle of proportionality in attack.34 According to Harold Koh, in 
relation to the al-Qaeda conflict, the U.S. administration while conducting lethal operations 
using armed drones, takes great care to abide by the principle of proportionality in both 
planning and execution and to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and not 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p. 119. 
29 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’. 
30 Amos N. Guiora, ‘Determining a Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker’, in Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 47 (2012), p. 327. See, ‘Obama claims US drone strikes have killed up to 116 
civilians’ in The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/01/obama-drones-strikes-civilian-
deaths> accessed 30 May 2018. 
31 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 51 (5) (b). 
32ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Database’<https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14> 
accessed 30 May 2018. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and Law of Armed Conflict’, p. 124. 
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civilians.35 Furthermore, the use of drones in targeting of individuals has helped in 
minimizing broader harm to civilians and civilian objects to a great extent.36 But, contrary to 
Koh’s arguments, the increased number of civilian casualties which include, children and 
women has shown that the U.S. seems to think of many civilians as legitimate targets if they 
are present in the vicinity of high value targets.37  
Note that, the determination of whether or not drone strikes meet the requirements of 
principle of proportionality will vary from case to case38 to ascertain whether the expected 
damage was excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated or not.39 It is possible 
that, even heavy losses to the civilian population or major damage to civilian objects may still 
meet the proportionality test. For instance, targeting of a senior leader of an armed group in a 
civilian area whose death may most likely result in termination of hostilities may not be 
considered illegal. On the other hand, targeting low level fighters in places where civilian 
casualty is guaranteed may well be termed as illegal.40 Therefore, how many civilians were 
killed or how many terrorists were eliminated, only forms the first part of the analysis. The 
key aspect, however, in fulfilling the test of proportionality is to establish whether the 
targeted individual was of sufficient value and whether the attack provided genuine military 
advantage and was the operation conducted with all appropriate caution in order to ensure the 
safety of civilians.41  
1.3) Precaution in planning and carrying out attacks: The duty to take precaution in 
planning and carrying out attacks is clearly codified under Article 57(1) of Additional 
Protocol I 1977.42 Though, Additional Protocol II 1977 does not specify the rules on 
precaution, it does not mean that the obligation to take precaution is not applicable to non-
international armed conflicts.43 The requirement to take precaution in attacks is directly 
linked to other customary rules applicable to non-international armed conflict, for example, 
                                                          
35 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’. 
36 Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (eds), Contemporary Debates On Terrorism (Routledge, 2012), p. 
171.  
37 Ahmad, ‘A Legal Assessment of the US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, p. 926. See, Amnesty International, ‘Will 
I be next? Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ <https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-
pakistan/> accessed 30 May 2018. Rafeequl Rehman, ‘My Mother was a victim of a U.S. drone’ in TIME 
<http://time.com/4422469/u-s-drone-strikes/> accessed 30 May 2018. 
38 Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and Law of Armed Conflict’, p. 127.  
39 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, p. 350.  
40 Ibid, p. 350. 
41 Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and Law of Armed Conflict’, p. 127.  
42 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 57 (1).  
43 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, p. 351.  
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the principles of distinction and proportionality.44 In addition, as per the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘state practice establishes the rule of precaution as a 
norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts’.45 As per the rule of precaution, the attacking state is required to take all 
feasible measures to ensure that only legitimate objectives are made targets and that 
precaution is taken to reduce collateral damage.46 The discussion on how the drone 
technology affects the principle of precaution needs to take place keeping in mind a 
fundamental point that, there is a shift in the situation to which the rule is to be applied, i.e., 
from an intense combat situation to situations of ‘signature strikes’.47 The argument here is 
that under intense combat situations, the immediate need is to protect troops on ground, 
maintain position and defeat the enemy. On the other hand, in situations of signature strikes, 
the only risk is of missing the opportunity of killing a suspected target. The former situation 
leaves little or no time for considering and taking precautionary steps than the latter. 
Nonetheless, the principle of precaution is applicable in both situations.48  
Now, whether or not armed drones abide by the rule of precaution is a controversial and 
divisive claim. Note that, in relation to making of kill-list, the U.S. administration claimed to 
have taken great efforts with respect to the selection of targets, such as, validating and vetting 
targets to satisfy its duty of precaution, thereby ensuring accuracy and limiting abuse of 
international humanitarian law principles.49 In addition, the claim is that the video feed 
available from the drone also aids in the monitoring of the target before action is taken; 
thereby, providing an opportunity to the drone operator to ensure the absence of civilians in 
and around the blast radius.50 Moreover, ‘except for Hellfire missiles using a thermobaric 
warhead, most missiles launched from armed drones are believed to have a smaller blast 
radius than other conventional munitions,’ further reducing the likelihood of harm to civilians 
                                                          
44 Ibid, p. 351. 
45 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: 
Rules’ (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2005) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf> accessed 
02 June 2018. 
46ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Database’<https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter5_rule15> 
accessed 04 June 2018.  
47 Frederik Rose´n, ‘Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and Legal Responsibility’, in 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 19 (2014), p. 128. 
48 Ibid, p. 128. 
49 Gregory S. McNeal, ‘Targeted Killing and Accountability’, in Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 102 (2014), p. 
728-729.  
50 Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘Pandora’s box? Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello and international human 
rights law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94 (2012), p. 607.  
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and civilian objects.51 Therefore, the use of armed drones fulfills the rule of precaution as it 
presents an efficient defensive measure which guarantees almost no risk to pilots and also 
allows for prior assessment of targets.52 Although, no lives are put in danger on the side of 
the drone-operating state, the accuracy of aiming at a target with armed drones should not be 
overstated.53 As noted by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, considerable failings have 
undeniably occurred by the U.S. in conducting of drone strikes resulting in civilian deaths.54 
Therefore, the question which drone technology presents before us is - What would constitute 
‘all feasible precautions’ in the context of the al-Qaeda conflict? In other words, the 
obligation to take all ‘feasible precautions’ would depend on how the term ‘feasible’ is 
interpreted.55 The drone technology, simply put, alters the conventional understanding of 
feasible precautionary measures.56 Considering the fact that in the near future the number of 
drones the U.S. possesses is most likely to increase and so will its use, in such a situation, 
what would be the material content of all feasible means; how much surveillance/intelligence 
gathering is required to satisfy the principle of precaution under international humanitarian 
law or where would be the line of precaution be drawn, are first of many questions that are 
yet to be answered.57    
1.4) Principle of Distinction: The common principle which underlies the law on targeting is 
distinction: ‘the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives’.58 This is 
accepted as one of the fundamental principles of the laws of armed conflict.59 The principle 
of distinction is based upon the notion that during armed conflict, civilian population and 
civilian objects must be respected and protected and for this the division of objects and 
people into separate categories is necessary.60 In relation to the law on targeting, the 
categorisation of objects and people is of utmost importance because this becomes the 
                                                          
51 Ibid, p. 607. 
52 Rose´n, ‘Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close’, p. 114. 
53 Hitomi Takemura, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Humanization From International Humanitarian Law’, in 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 32 (2014), p. 532. 
54 Ibid, p. 533. 
55 Rose´n, ‘Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close’, p. 128. 
56 Ibid, p. 130. 
57 Rose´n, ‘Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close’, p. 130. 
58 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 48. 
59 Advisory opinion on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep, 8 July 1996, para 
78. 




deciding factor in determining whether the targeting of a particular individual was lawful or 
not.61 Put differently, ‘an individual might be lawfully targeted and killed on account of his 
category of status rather than whether he poses an individual threat at that particular 
moment’.62 In the context of international armed conflict, the principle of distinction is 
therefore, based upon the assertion that an individual either falls into the category of a 
civilian or a combatant.63 
Combatants: The term ‘combatant’ does not find a mention in the rules pertaining to non-
international armed conflict.64 According to international humanitarian law rules governing 
international armed conflicts, combatants are those who are allowed to take part in hostilities 
and who are entitled to prisoner of war status upon capture.65 There is, however, a drawback 
to being recognised as a combatant. While achieving a combatant status confers combatant 
privilege on an individual, it also subjects that particular individual to an attack at any time 
during the hostilities.66 Given that, ‘targeting of combatants is based upon their status as 
combatants and not upon their dangerousness; combatants may be lawfully targeted 
regardless of whether they pose a current threat to their opponents, whether or not they are 
armed, or even awake. The only situations in which international humanitarian law limits the 
right to attack a combatant are when that combatant has surrendered or been rendered hors de 
combat.67  
Civilians: International humanitarian law governing international armed conflicts does not 
provide a descriptive definition for the term ‘civilian’; nevertheless, the law defines civilians 
negatively as all non-combatants.68 Under non-international armed conflict, defining a 
civilian is even more complex.69 Even as Common Article 3 does not make an express 
mention of the term ‘civilian’, Additional Protocol II 1977 appears to use the notion of 
‘civilian’ to portray any person not fitting into one of the categories mentioned in Article 1 
                                                          
61 Ibid, p. 135. 
62 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, p. 135. 
63 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’, in New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42 (2010), p. 700. 
64 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, p. 136. 
65 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 43 (2) and art 44 (1).  
66 Michael W. Lewis, ‘Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield’, in Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 
47 (2012), p. 309-310.  
67 Ibid, p. 309-310. 
68 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 50 (1). 
69 Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 317. 
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(1) of Additional Protocol II.70 There appears to be no clear demarcation between combatants 
and civilians among non-state actors engaged in a non-international armed conflict.71 With 
regard to the rules on targeting, under international humanitarian law, civilians are immune 
from being targeted, unless they give up their immunity by taking direct part in hostilities.72 
Thus, by participating in hostilities civilians forfeit their immunity for the duration of their 
participation.73 Note that, the protection under Article 51 (3) of Additional Protocol I, which 
is also a customary law,74 ‘refers to the prohibition contained in Articles 51(1), (2), and (4) 
through (8), which provides that civilians are not to be made the object of attack, and that 
civilians are to be protected from the dangers arising from military operations’.75 The rule 
under Article 51 (3) is also applicable to non-international armed conflicts.76  
But, the interpretation of Article 51 (3) has become the subject of furious debate, especially 
regarding the issue of categorisation of members of organised armed groups in a non-
international armed conflict either as combatants or as civilians who lose their immunity 
against attack while taking part in hostilities. In addition, despite the implication of direct 
participation in hostilities for the protection of civilians, there is no definition provided under 
international humanitarian law for the term ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities’.77 Nonetheless, it seems clear that, states need to comply with the principle of 
distinction while using force under international humanitarian law, i.e., only combatants or 
military objectives can be targeted and not civilians or civilian objects, unless the protected 
status has been forfeited by taking part in hostilities.78  
Coming back to the al-Qaeda conflict, the main criticism against the U.S. targeting practices 
has been its failure to meet the requirement of distinction, i.e., whether or not drone strikes 
sufficiently distinguishes between civilian and military targets, taking into consideration the 
loss of civilian protected status by direct participation.79 The following section will therefore, 
address this issue in light of the controversies associated with the phrase, direct participation 
                                                          
70 Ibid, p. 317. 
71 Lewis and Crawford, ‘Drones and Distinction’, p. 1146. 
72 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 51 (3). 
73 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, p. 142. 
74 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and Ors. v Israel and Ors, HCJ 769/02, 13 December 2006, 
(para 30).  
75 Lewis and Crawford, ‘Drones and Distinction’, p.  1146. 
76 Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection of 
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Section 2. Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
It needs to be understood that, in so far as the al-Qaeda conflict is considered, terrorists often 
target civilians, conduct operations in civilian surroundings and by posing as civilians they, 
also, intentionally try to conceal their combatant status.80 In addition, al-Qaeda and its 
associate force, regularly use civilians and civilian objects as shields to protect themselves 
from drone strikes.81 Therefore, the U.S. has been repeatedly forced to battle al-Qaeda 
terrorists in a civilian setting. Because of such a situation, the U.S. has the responsibility to 
take all feasible measures to ensure that it is targeting the right persons and if civilians are 
being targeted, to make certain that such civilians have given up their protected status by 
directly taking part in hostilities.82 Although, there is a debate with reference to whether or 
not ‘combatant status’ ought to be recognised in non-international armed conflicts, that 
debate is not relevant as far as the question pertaining to the status of al-Qaeda and its 
associate forces is concerned (because combatant status is based upon membership in a group 
that organisationally enforces compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict. Groups such as al-Qaeda, whose means and methods of warfare include, 
deliberately targeting civilians, cannot claim combatant status for their members).83 Under 
international humanitarian law, if an individual does not fulfill the requirement of a lawful 
combatant, he is engaging in a conflict without combatant privilege; therefore, he is either an 
unlawful combatant or a civilian who has given up his protected status. Likewise, members of 
al-Qaeda and its associate forces, do not meet the requirements of a lawful combatant status, 
and hence are unprotected civilians.84 The issue of when or under what circumstances does a 
civilian lose his protected status is of great importance to the al-Qaeda conflict.85 However, as 
mentioned in the above section, international humanitarian law does not define the phrase, 
‘unless and for such time as they take direct part in hostilities’, as it appears respectively in 
Protocol I and II.86 Thus, in order to interpret the notion of direct participation in hostilities in 
light of the circumstances existing in modern-day armed conflict, the ICRC conducted an 
informal clarification process from 2003 to 2008 which concluded in June 2009 with the 
publication of ICRC Interpretive Guidance that defines direct participation in both 
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international as well as non-international armed conflict as explained below.87 
In a non-international armed conflict, as per the ICRC, an individual needs to carry out a 
‘continuous combat function’ in order to be targetable as a combatant.88 Furthermore, the 
ICRC makes a distinction between civilians that are engaged in a ‘continuous combat 
function’ and who constitute the organised armed groups of a non-state actor, from those 
‘civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or 
unorganised basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat 
functions’.89 According to the ICRC, civilians who temporarily participate in hostilities may 
only be targeted for the time they are engaged in such a conduct.90 The Interpretive Guidance 
also states that, ‘in order to qualify as direct participation, a specific act must meet the 
following constitutive elements: (1) the act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of 
harm); (2) there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result 
either from that act or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation); (3) the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the 
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus).91 The elements proposed by the ICRC are intended to make sure that 
those individuals who perform a subsidiary function or provide marginal support are 
excluded from being targeted, setting aside targeting for serious actions that have an adverse 
effect on the enemy.92 But despite the ICRC’s interpretation, what still remains unclear or 
less accurately explained in the context of contemporary armed conflict, is which activities 
can be linked to a ‘continuous combat function’ in order to result in the forfeiture of protected 
status.93 In other words, question still remains as to what constitutes a combat function or a 
direct participation in hostilities. The categorisation of certain actions, for example, issue 
concerning individuals like bomb makers is highly controversial and as per the Interpretive 
Guidance, bomb makers do not fall into the category of individuals who carry out continuous 
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combat function.94 However, it can be argued that bomb makers as ‘continuous combat 
functionaries are targetable if they are providing a military capacity otherwise unavailable to 
their armed group’.95 Coming to the final part of the overall test proposed by the ICRC, i.e., 
temporal aspect of loss of protected status; as per the Interpretive Guidance, civilians only 
lose their immunity from attack for the duration of each act of direct participation in 
hostilities.96 On the other hand, high-level members of organised armed groups lack this 
‘revolving door’ of protection/loss of protection. For the time such individuals are believed to 
be performing a continuous combat function, they remain targetable.97 Note that, the loss of 
protected status for individual acts comprises a temporal element: ‘measures preparatory to 
the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment 
to and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that act’.98  
But, contrary to the ICRC’s position on direct participation in hostilities, the Obama 
administration considered individuals who are merely part of an armed group to be 
belligerents and therefore, lawful targets under international law.99 In addition, as per Harold 
Koh, ‘Targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and 
to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects’.100 It is argued that, the ICRC’s 
position on individuals who involve themselves in hostilities only on a ‘spontaneous, 
sporadic, or unorganised basis’ or those who do not engage in combat functions may not be 
targeted, appears to have misinterpreted the true nature of the al-Qaeda conflict.101 The main 
purpose of al-Qaeda as a transnational non-state entity is to spread its ideology through 
violent means across the globe.102 For that reason, it is most likely that, according to the U.S., 
every individual member (from religious leaders to low-level individuals performing support 
functions) of al-Qaeda and its associate forces supports al-Qaeda’s mission. Thus, in such a 
situation, every individual of al-Qaeda is engaged in hostilities or is performing a combat 
function against the U.S.103  
But going by the ICRC’s test, such individuals are most likely not to be covered under the 
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continuous combat function description.104 Thus, ‘to permit a state to target a terrorist only 
for such time as he is engaged in a hostile act is to give the terrorist the best of both worlds - 
the protections of a civilian and the rights of a combatant’.105 As a result, in light of the 
controversy regarding the ICRC’s interpretation of direct participation, the issue of whether 
or not U.S. drone strikes distinguish between civilians and combatants most likely depends 
upon the understanding of when does a civilian lose his protected status and becomes legally 
targetable under international humanitarian law.106   
 
Conclusion 
The debate around the unique nature of the U.S. drone policy is the result of an over reliance 
on the novelty of drones, and not enough on the repercussions resulting from its unfettered 
use. The U.S. counter-terrorism policy under the Obama administration created an 
unparalleled militarised approach to counter-terrorism in the form of unmanned aerial 
vehicles or drones.107  
However, its response to transnational terrorism has caused a never-ending debate, especially 
since the 9/11 attacks. Issues such as lack of adequate information about the target and the 
strike location have raised questions on the legality and accountability of the drone operation. 
Another greater concern is regarding the unregulated use of drones, i.e., since drones make it 
easier to kill, therefore, policy makers are more tempted to interpret the legal restrictions on 
who can be killed, and under what circumstances, too broadly. Therefore, in the absence of 
clarity on U.S. drone policy and the fact that the drone usage is only going to increase in the 
near future, it is required that the rules on targeting and identification of parties to the conflict 
are interpreted more comprehensively.108 Additionally, on the issue of accountability, which 
is a major concern vis-à-vis drone usage, it is necessary that the U.S. and other similar 
administrations voluntarily give out essential details about their targeting practices. 
Furthermore, if any of the state employed standards are found to be incompatible with 
existing laws, then they should not form part of security policies.109  
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In short, the attempt should not be to force down an accountability regime at the outset, 
especially, to an area of law that is still developing, and which is concerned with 
national/global security. Neither, a complete change of existing laws should be advocated so 
as to only suit a specific weapon problem or propose standards that cannot be applied to 
practical situations. But, an effort should be made to put down agreeable standards that not 
only help in achieving military objectives but also recognise those fundamental principles 
that form the basis of the law of armed conflict. Because, unless such measures are in place, 
states are bound to twist existing rules to justify their actions.  
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